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4.

Statement of Jurisdiction
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3(2)(j).
5.

Statement of Issues and Standard of Review
First Issue: is Gillman entitled to a double recovery for the $3,565.47 in

medical no-fault, personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits she had already
receivedfromher own automobile insurance company prior to the trial?
Standard of Review for First Issue: a trial court's conclusion of law in a
civil case is reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater
Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Second Issue: may a litigant recover costs under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure if one has not complied with Rule 54?
Standard of Review for Second Issue: two standards of review apply to
this issue. First, correctness, as in the First Issue. Second, even if the trial judge
was incorrect that costs may not be awarded as a matter of law in the absence of
timely compliance with Rule 54, did the judge abuse his discretion in declining to
award costs? Lyon v. Burton, 5P3d 616, 637 (Utah 2000).
Third Issue: should the sanctity of the jury deliberation room be violated
based on mere speculation and in the absence of any facts remotely approaching
5

Bishop v. Gen Tec Inc., 48 P.3d 218 (Utah 2002)?
Standard of Review for Third Issue: whether a trial court should grant a
post-trial motion to amend a judgment is discretionary, and the standard of review
is abuse of discretion. Gillmor v. Wright, 850P.2d 431, 434-36 (Utah 1993);
Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass % 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982)
6.

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules and Regulations
Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative on the

issue of costs. It states:
The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and
file with the court a like memorandum thereof
duly verified . . .
7.

Statement of the Case
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Gillman was involved in a motor vehicle intersection accident with

defendant Isom. Gillman received minor injuries. Gillman had her own
automobile insurance policy that provided the no-fault Personal Injury Protection
("PIP") benefits required by the State of Utah. Gillman treated with medical care
providers of her choice, and Gillman duly received $3565.47 in PIP benefits from
6

her own insurer. Gillman then sued Isom. The case was tried to a jury. The trial
judge allowed Gillman to put into evidence all of her medical special damages
evidence, including the $3565.47. After a three day trial, the jury returned its
Special Verdict finding Gillman 10% at fault, and awarding her $5126.00 in
medical special damages and $10,000.00 in general damages. Pursuant to Isom's
motion, and also pursuant to the agreement of Gillman's trial lawyer, the judge
then reduced the medical special damage award by the $3565.47 in PIP benefits
Gillman had already received. The judge also reduced the Special Verdict by
10% for Gillman's 10% comparitive fault as determined by the jury, resulting in
the entry of a Judgment in the amount of $ 10,047.93. Gillman failed to file a
timely verified memorandum of costs, fatal under Utah law to any award of costs,
and the trial judge did not award costs. Gillman appealed.
B. Statement of Facts
Gillman was involved in a motor vehicle intersection accident with
defendant Isom. R.,1-3. Gillman received minor injuries, had her own automobile
insurance policy that provided the no-fault PIP benefits required by the State of
Utah, treated with medical care providers of her choice, and duly received
$3565.47 in PIP benefits from her own insurer. R. 140-148. Gillman then sued
Isom. The case was tried to a jury. The trial judge allowed Gillman to put into
7

evidence all of her medical special damages evidence, including the $3565.47.
After a tliree day trial, the jury returned its Special Verdict finding Gillman 10%
at fault, and awarding her $5,126.00 in medical special damages and $10,000.00
in general damages. R.,273-275. Pursuant to Isom's motion, and also pursuant to
the agreement of Gillman's trial lawyer, the judge reduced the medical special
damage award by the $3565.47 in PIP benefits Gillman had already received.
R.,140-148, 277-279, and 430, pp. 11-12. The judge also reduced the Special
Verdict by 10% for Gillman's 10% comparitive fault as determined by the jury,
resulting in the entry of a Judgment in the amount of $10,047.93. R.,277-279.
Gillman failed to file a timely verified memorandum of costs, fatal under Utah
law to any award of costs, and the trial judge did not award costs. R., 287-288.
8.

Summary of Argument
More than twenty years of Utah no-fault PIP cases clearly establish that

Gillman is not entitled to a double recovery from Isom for the no-fault PIP
benefits she has already receivedfromher own automobile insurance policy.
Failure to file a timely verified memorandum of costs is fatal under Utah
law to any award of costs, and Gillman's memorandum was untimely. In any
event, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to award costs.
Gillman fails to approach the Bishop v. Gen Tec rationale for invading the
8

sanctity of the jury deliberation room. Gilhnan, unlike Bishop, has not produced an
iota of evidence that the Special Verdict reflects anything other than exactly what
the jury meant to award Gillman
9.

Argument
POINT I
GILLMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO A DOUBLE
RECOVERY FOR THE $3565.47 IN NO-FAULT
PIP BENEFITS SHE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980), held that a
tortfeasor is not personally liable to the no-fault injured insured for special damages
previously compensated by PIP benefits from the no-fault insurer, and that the
injured party should, therefore, not be allowed to plead for those damages against
the tortfeasor.
In Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P2. 1282,1287-1291, (Utah App.
1997), the Court discussed thoroughly the basic anti double recovery proposition of
Allstate and the numerous cases that reaffirmed it including, for example, Dupuis v.
Nielson, 624 P. 2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981), and Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass n
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). The holding of Allstate is "predicated upon the
proposition that a basic principle of the No-Fault Act is to prevent double recovery
9

by the no-fault insured/' {Dupuis, supra, at 686), and "thus to avoid increased costs
of insurance coverage" {Laub, supra, at 1309).
Laub 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), not only vigorously reaffirmed the holding
of Allstate, it also strenuously emphasized that an injured plaintiff "should therefore
not be allowed even to plead for (special damages previously compensated by PIP
benefits from the no-fault insurer)/' {Laub at 1307), and that pleading for previously
compensated damages is improper and that a judgment should never include the
previously compensated benefits.
Now, on appeal, Gillman argues, for the first time, that the 1985 revision of
the insurance code overrules Ivie and its progeny. Gillman argues that the pre 1985
subparagraph (2) of old Section 31-41-9 does not appear in the 1985 reenacted
Section 31A-22-309, and that, according to Gillman, this somehow reverses twenty
years of appellate court decisions. Gillman's argument ignores the fact that the very
subparagraph (2) of old Section 31-41-9 upon which Gillman's argument relies still
appears in the reenacted insurance code at Section 41-12a-304. Moreover, it is
troubling that Gillman's new argument now ignores specific language of Bear River
v. Wall, a case Gillman cited to the trial jugde in Gillman's Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Amend Judgment, R.,301. In fact, Bear River v. Wall, cited by
Gillman below, but not here, addresses and rejects the very argument Gillman now
10

makes.
First, at footnote 6 on page 1287, Bear River v. Wall points out that the old
subparagraph (2) of old Section 31-41-9 now appears, substantially identical, in
Section 41-12a-304.
Second, at footnote 3 on page 1285, Bear River v. Wall, a 1997 case,
specifically states that supreme court cases following the 1985 reenactment of the
No-Fault Insurance Act "have not interpreted the current provisions of the statute at
issue differently from the former provisions."
Third, at page 1291, in 1997, 12 years after the 1985 reenactment of the
insurance code, the Bear River v. Wall court still recognized the principle that the
tortfeasor is not personally liable for PIP benefits, and that the purpose of the nofault statute is to prevent double recovery.
Indeed, Bear River, at footnote 13 on page 1290, quotes Laub at 1307:
the injured party should therefore not be allowed
even to plead for [PIP benefits]. However, if a plaintiff
does improperly plead for previously compensated
damages and they are allowed to be included in the
judgement, the court should . . . reduce the judgment
by the amount of those previously compensated damages,
and thereby prevent double recovery.
Given Allstate and its progeny, the trial judge was quite correct in not
allowing Gillman a double recovery for the $3,565.47 in PIP benefits that she had
11

undisputedly received.
Gillman is in a bad equity position to complain. The trial judge gave Gillman
a break by allowing her to put on evidence of the $3565.47, which undoubtedly
drove up the pain and suffering, general damages award, before the judge reduced
the verdict by the $3565.47 in special damages. Gillman's trial lawyer lodged no
objection to the specific verdict reduction recitals in the proposed Judgement on
Special Verdict before it was entered, nor is there any evidence from Gillman's
trial lawyer that this was not the way the judge and counsel agreed to handle the
matter. R., 430 at pages 11-12. (Gillman's lawyer on appeal, her husband, did not
participate in the trial as a lawyer, but, rather, as a witness for his wife.) The trial
judge was perfectly free to grant the set off at any point, and the Judgement on
Special Verdict reflects precisely what the judge did, as does the Order Denying
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment.
POINT II
GILLMAN IS NOT ENTITLED TO
COSTS BECAUSE GILLMAN DID NOT
COMPLY WITH RULE 54 (d)(2). IN ANY
EVENT, THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS
DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING COSTS.
Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is the applicable rule. It
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requires a party who claims costs to, within 5 days of Entry of Judgment (the trial
judge signed the Judgment on April 26,2002 and the Judgment was entered on
April 29, 2002) "file with the court [a memorandum of costs] duly verified . . . "
(emphasis added). In this case, no verified memorandum was filed until well after
the 5 day window provided by Rule 54(d)(2). Indeed,on May 13, 2002, Isom filed
a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Have Costs Taxed By Court (R.,340-343)
that stated:
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY
COSTS BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT
COMPLIED WITH RULE 54(d)(2).
Although Gillman's's initial offering was captioned "Verified," it was not
verified, nor was there an "affiant" as required by the rule. R., 287-288; Addendum
Exhibit 2. Moreover, Gillman admitted to the trial court she had not complied with
the rule when, on May 21, 2002, Gillman, in her Reply in Support of Motion to
Amend Judgement, told the judge she had "amended the Verified Memorandum of
Costs . . . to add a verification page. An oversight was made in the original. ..
wliich has since been corrected." R., 377. It was only after May 13, long after the 5
day window closed, that Gillman belatedly complied with the rule. Therefore,
having failed to timely comply with the applicable rule, Gillman was not entitled to
13

any costs. Lyon v. Burton, 5 P. 3d 616 (Utah 2000), held that compliance with the
rule is mandatory and leaves no discretion to the trial judge.
Finally, in any event, it has long been the rule that even if there has been
compliance with Rule 54(d)(2), the awarding of costs is discretionary with the trial
judge. Lyon v. Burton at 637. Gillman has presented no evidence that the trial judge
abused his discretion. At pages 21-22 of her Brief, Gillman argues Isom did not
dispute any of her costs except the mediation. This simply ignores the record, not
only what is mentioned above, but also the transcript of the hearing on the post trial
motions, R., 430, wherein, at page 10, Isom made both the Rule 54 (d)(2) argument
and opposed deposition costs.
POINT m
GILLMAN'S BISHOP V. GEN TEC ARGUMENT
IS INCORRECT. THERE WAS NO DOUBLE
REDUCTION FOR GILLMAN'S OWN FAULT.
GILLMAN'S CLAIM THAT THE JURY REDUCED
HER DAMAGES BY HER 10% COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE IS PURE SPECULATION.
Gillman's claim here is, apparently, that based upon the jury's question,
which was not objected to at the time, "Do we account for the effect of joint
negligence or does the Court," that the jury somehow, on its own, contrary to the
instructions that it had been given, reduced the plaintiffs award by 10% when it
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answered the questions on the Special Verdict. This, however, is pure speculation.
Before the jury started to deliberate, the judge instructed the jury with no objection
from Gillman. When the jury sent out its question, the judge instructed the jury,
again with no objection from Gillman, in response to the jury's question, "Please
complete the Special Verdict Form exactly as written, in accordance with your
answers as you proceed through the form." It is pure speculation that the jury
reduced the damages by 10% when it answered the questions on the Special Verdict
Form. It is more likely the jury followed the Court's instructions. The $10,000
award evidences that the jury did not reduce by 10%. $11,111 is an odd number, but
if the jury had reduced by 10%, $ 11,111.11 would have had to be the jury's number
for the jury to, as Gillman now speculates, reduce by 10% on its own. This too, is
pure speculation, but evidences the quagmire we venture into if we go by anything
other than the Special Verdict.
Gillman fails to approach the Bishop v. Gen Tec rationale for invading the
sanctity of the jury deliberation room. Gillman, unlike Bishop, produced not an iota
of evidence that the Special Verdict reflects anything other than exactly what the jury
meant to award Gillman.
Also, in our pending case, unlike Bishop, the mathematics defeat Gillman's
wish for more money. In Bishop, the verdict form awarded Bishop $750,000 for
15

general damages and found Bishop 25% at fault. Bishop's lawyer, Mr. Young, then
came forward with affidavits from three jurors, including the foreperson, that the jury
found Bishop's general damages to be $1,000,000, and that the jury already reduced
the general damages by 25% of fault, thus resulting in the $750,000 the jury wrote in
on the verdict form.
In our pending case, the jury awarded Gilhnan $10,000 in general damages,
and found her to be 10% at fault. Gillman, unlike Bishop, has not come forward with
a single affidavit. The mathematics supported Bishop's argument. Not so for
Gillman. For Gilhnan's argument to work that the jury already reduced Gillman's
award for her percentage of fault and that the judge did it a second time, the jury's
raw number for general damages would have to have been $11,111.11,a very
strange number for general damages indeed.
10.

Conclusion Stating Precise Relief Sought
All of the arguments Gillman raises on appeal have no merit. The Judgment

should be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this

G

day of MRCti , 2003.

By
Robert H. Henderson
Attorney for Defendant and Appellee

16

Addendum
A. Judgment on Special Verdict
B. Verifled(sic) Memorandum of Cost(sic)
C. Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgement

C:\Documents and Settings\robert\My Documents\12205Y70\brief of appellee\brief of appellee, wpd

17

A D D E N D U M EXHIBIT 1

'V ^.'M^.nalDfst.ict

APR fi 4 200?
wepui/ Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA GILLMAN,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 000907532

vs.
LOWELL H, ISOM,
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendant.
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

Please answer the following questions. If six of you are persuaded by the
evidence in favor of the question presented, answer it "yes." If, on the question, six
of you are not so persuaded, or if you are persuaded by the evidence against the
question presented, answer it "no."
1. Was the defendant negligent?
ANSWER: Yes

No

(If you answered No. 1 above "no," then go no further and return to the
courtroom.)

-2-

2.

If you answered No 1 above "yes," was such negligence a proximate

cause of the accident?
/

ANSWER: Yes

No

J
(If you answered No. 2 above "no," then go no further and return to the
courtroom.)
3.

Was the plaintiff negligent?
ANSWER: Yes

4.

K

No

If you answered No. 3 above "yes," was such negligence a proximate

cause of the accident?
ANSWER: Yes
5.

\(

No

If you answered "yes" to Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 above, then what

percentage of the negligence should be allocated to defendant, and what percentage
of negligence should be allocated to plaintiff?
Plaintiff

/P %

Defendant
(Total must equal 100%)

-3-

6-

What amount would fairly compensate plaintiff for the injuries

proximately caused by the accident?
Special Damages

$.

General Damages

$^

DC
1/ —~

Dated this 4~ day of April, 2002.
J

tTRY FOREPERSON

ci

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2

DuaneH. Gillman, #1194
Leslie J. Randolph, #5009
MCDOWELL & GILLMAN, P.C.
Twelfth Floor
50 West Broadway, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone (801) 359-3500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA GILLMAN,
Plaintiff,

;)
;

VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COST

)
;
])

Case No. 00907532

V.

LOWELL H. ISOM,
Defendant.

The Honorable Judge W. Bohling

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss
County of Salt Lake )
I, Leslie J. Randolph, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am an attorney duly admitted to the Bar of the State of Utah and am a member of

the Law Office of McDowell & Gillman, P.C, attorneys for the plaintiff in this action.
2.

I am informed and believe that the following costs and disbursements are correct

-1-

and have been necessarily incurred in this action:
(a).
(b).
(c).
(d).
(e).
(f).

Filing Fees (complaint) $120.00
Jury Demand Fee $50.00
Constable Service Complaint $35.00
Deposition Transcript $384.35.
Witness fee & Mileage (Dr. States) $24.11
Court Ordered Mediation $250.00
TOTAL $ 863.43

DATED this 3rd day of May 2002.

teslie J. Randolph
McDowell & Gillman, W.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of May, 2002,1 did deliver by U.S. Mail, first class
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion to the following person(s):

Robert H. Henderson
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

McDowell & Gillman, P.C

-2-

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 3

ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A 1461)
Attorney for Defendant
191 North Canyon Road
Post Office Box 112350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone (801) 355-1574
Facsimile (801) 355-1582

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LINDA GTLLMAN, Plaintiff,
vs
LOWELL H. ISOM, Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGEMENT
Judge William L. Bohling
Civil No. 000907532

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment came on regularly for a hearing on July 25, 2002.
The parties were represented by their counsel of record. The court had reviewed the memoranda
and fully heard the argument of counsel. The court is of the opinion that a plaintiff may not
"double dip" for no-fault benefits previously received, that there is no evidence the jury applied
the 10% reduction for plaintiffs fault to its damage award, and the court uses its discretion to
deny any award of costs in this case. Based thereon, now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that the
Motion to Amend Judgement be, and hereby is denied.
Dated this i ? day of A>J » T ,2002.
BY THE COURT

District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I served the attached Order Denying Motion To Amend
Judgement
(Case Number 907532, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:

Duane H. Gillman
McDowell & Gillman, P.C.
Twelfth Floor
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and mailedfirstclass, postage prepaid, on the ^D

day of July, 2002.

HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I, Robert H. Henderson, hereby certify that on March 6, 2003 I personally
hand delivered two true and correct copies of the forgoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE
to counsel for appellant by personally delivering them to his office in an envelope
addressed Duane H. Gillman, counsel for Linda Gilhnan, at 50 West Broadway,
Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

Dc^/J/gLL^
ROBERT H. HENDERSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

